The Gemara answers: There, in the case of spreading out the hide, the matter is not so evident that it is spread out for tanning because in its current state, it is fit to recline on, and therefore it can be said that one placed it for this purpose. However, here, with regard to fats, he himself might come to say: What is the reason that the Sages permitted it to me? So that it will not emit a foul odor. If so, what is the difference to me if I spread them out, and what is the difference to me if I salt them? This reasoning will lead one to salt hides, which is a prohibited labor.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: A person may salt on a Festival several pieces of meat at one time, although he requires only one piece, as it is all one act of salting. Rav Adda bar Ahava would employ artifice and salt bone by bone. After salting one bone, he would say: I prefer this one instead, and would thereby salt all the meat in his possession.

MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: One may not remove the shutters [terisin] of a store on a Festival, due to the prohibition against building and demolishing. And Beit Hillel permit one not only to open the shutters, but even to replace them.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What are these shutters? Ulla said: This is referring to shutters of shops. The marketplace shops or stalls were large crates or wagons, not buildings. They were closed at night with shutters. The shopkeepers would open the shutters on the Festival so that people who did not manage to finish all of their Festival preparations before the Festival could take the articles they required and settle accounts with the storekeeper later. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed whether the shutters may be opened and closed on the Festival itself.

And Ulla said: With regard to three matters, the Sages permitted an action whose result is undesirable in order to encourage a desirable initial action. And these are the three matters: First, they permitted spreading out the hide of an animal slaughtered on a Festival before those who will tread on it, a stage in its tanning. This was permitted because the Sages wish to encourage slaughtering the animal to enable celebration on the Festival. And second, the Sages permitted the replacement of shutters of shops on a Festival, so that storeowners could supply the Festival requirements for those in need.

And the third permitted action is the replacement of a bandage in the Temple. If a priest had an injury on his hand, he would have to remove the bandage while performing the Temple service, as it is prohibited for any item to interpose between his hand and whatever he must handle as part of the rite. After concluding his Temple service, he was allowed to replace the bandage on Shabbat, despite the fact that this is ordinarily prohibited, so as not to discourage him from engaging in Temple service.

And Raḥava said that Rabbi Yehuda said: There is also one other matter, i.e., another instance where the Sages permitted an action whose result was undesirable in order to encourage a desirable initial action. This concerns a ḥaver, a member of a group that is meticulous with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity, who opens his barrel of wine or prepares and begins to sell his dough to pilgrims for the sake of the Festival.

And this is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: He may finish selling all the bread made from that dough and all the wine in the barrel. Wine or dough sold to the general public is usually classified as ritually impure, as it might have been touched by an am ha’aretz, one who is not careful with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity. During a Festival, however, the Sages decreed that all wine and dough sold in Jerusalem is ritually pure, so as not to embarrass ignorant people, and they may therefore be bought even by a ḥaver. Rabbi Yehuda adds that even if a large quantity of wine or dough remains after the Festival, it retains its status as ritually pure and one may continue to sell it to a ḥaver. This is a case of permitting an action whose result is undesirable for the sake of an initial action, in that the Sages maintained the wine and dough’s status as ritually pure after the Festival in order to encourage people to sell wine and dough on the Festival.

With regard to Ulla’s statement, the Gemara asks: We already learned the halakha that one may spread out an animal’s hide before those who will tread on it. Why did Ulla find it necessary to restate an explicit teaching of a mishna? The Gemara explains: Lest you say that the reason of Beit Hillel is because the hide is fit for reclining on it, and therefore even if the animal was slaughtered on the eve of the Festival, it would also be permitted to spread out its hide on the Festival. Ulla therefore teaches us that the reason for the leniency is that the Sages permitted an action whose result was undesirable in order to encourage a desirable initial action. Consequently, in the case of an animal slaughtered on a Festival, yes, this halakha applies; but with regard to one that was slaughtered on the eve of a Festival, no, one may not spread out its hide.

The Gemara further asks: We already learned the halakha of the shutters of shops as well, as the mishna states that Beit Hillel permit one even to replace them. The Gemara explains: This, too, is necessary. Lest you say: Beit Hillel’s reason for being lenient is that there is no prohibition of building with regard to vessels and no prohibition of dismantling with regard to vessels. Since these shops are not attached to the ground, they are vessels rather than houses, and it is therefore permitted to replace their shutters; and as a result, the dismantlement and replacement of shutters of large vessels, even of those found in houses, should also be permitted. To counter this logic, Ulla therefore teaches us that the reason the Sages allowed the replacement of shutters of shops on a Festival is because they permitted an action whose result is undesirable in order to encourage a desirable initial action. Consequently, in the case of the shutters of shops, yes, they permitted their replacement; in the case of those of houses, no, they did not allow it.

The Gemara further asks: We already learned the halakha of the replacement of a bandage in the Temple as well: One may replace a bandage in the Temple but not in the rest of the country. The Gemara explains that this halakha is necessary. Lest you say: What is the reason that a bandage may be replaced? It is because rabbinic decrees prohibiting labor do not apply in the Temple. Since the prohibition against applying a bandage is by rabbinic law, this leniency should apply to all who are in the Temple, even to a priest who is not a candidate to perform the Temple service. Ulla teaches us that this is not the case; rather, it is an instance where the Sages permitted a result for the sake of an initial action: If one is a candidate for service, yes, he may replace his bandage; if one is not a candidate for service, no, he may not replace his bandage.

The Gemara asks a similar question with regard to Raḥava’s addition: We already learned the halakha of one who opens his barrel of wine, as well: In the case of one who opens his barrel to sell its wine, and similarly in the case of one who begins selling his dough for the sake of the Festival, the substance is ritually pure. If some is left over, the tanna’im disputed whether it retains its presumed status as ritually pure after the Festival and one may continue to sell it to a ḥaver. Rabbi Yehuda says: He may finish selling the wine or dough, and the Rabbis say: He may not finish. What is added by including it in the list of matters where a result is permitted for the sake of an initial action?

The Gemara explains: Raḥava’s statement is necessary. Lest you say: It is permitted to finish selling the wine or dough because the Sages rendered the ritual impurity of an am ha’aretz on a Festival as ritually pure, and although one did not begin to sell this wine or dough on the Festival but at an earlier stage, he should likewise be permitted to finish, as items do not contract ritual impurity on a Festival. To counter this logic, Raḥava therefore teaches us: In this case, too, the Sages permitted an action whose result is undesirable in order to encourage a desirable initial action. If one had begun, yes, he may finish selling; if one had not begun, no, he may not do so.

The Gemara asks: And Ulla, what is the reason that he did he not state this halakha alongside the other cases he listed? The Gemara answers: He is not dealing with a case that is a matter of dispute. He listed only cases where the ruling is unanimous. The Gemara challenges this: These other three matters are also subject to dispute, as they all involve a disagreement between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. The Gemara answers: When Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, Beit Shammai’s opinion is not considered a legitimate opinion in the Mishna, and it is completely disregarded. Since everyone knows that Beit Shammai’s opinion is entirely rejected by halakha, it is not taken into consideration. Therefore, those cases are not viewed as disputes at all.

§ The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that one may remove shutters on a Festival. They disagree only as to whether it is permitted to replace them, as well, as Beit Shammai say: One may not replace them, and Beit Hillel say: One may even replace them. And in what case is this statement said? When these shutters have a hinge that can be inserted into a slot in the side of the vessel. However, if they do not have a hinge, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as this is merely replacement of a board, and it is not similar to building.

The Gemara challenges this claim: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: In what case is this statement said? What is the situation in which Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree? They disagree when the shutters do not have a hinge; however, if they have a hinge, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. Abaye said that the two sources can be reconciled: When they have a hinge on the side, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, as the placement of a hinge in the side is a complicated endeavor that resembles building. If they have no hinge at all, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as it is considered merely the replacement of a board. When they disagree, it is with regard to a case where they have a hinge in the middle rather than on the side.